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LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA
v. FRENCH
By RIcIHARD 0. GAsPARiNI*
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Society of
Upper Canada v. French' illustrates the necessity of relying upon precedent
when one is confronted with the task of classifying an administrative function.
The task of classifying an administrative function is at best, highly complex;
at worst, desperately confusing. The decision in the French case only adds to
the confusion.
Several complaints against Stephen French, an Ontario solicitor, were
heard by the Discipline Committee of the Law Society of Upper Canada;
the committee found that most of the complaints had been established. In a
document prepared in accordance with The Law Society Act,2 the committee
recommended to the Convocation of Benchers that the solicitor be suspended
for a period of three months. French was then notified that he might appeal
as of right, and that any objections to the findings of fact or conclusions of
law contained in the committee's decision must be filed forthwith.3
The solicitor responded with a letter addressed to the Law Society in
which he insisted that none of the members of the Discipline Committee who
had previously heard evidence against him participate in the deliberations of
Convocation.
However, the Law Society concluded that the sitting of the Discipline
Committee members on Convocation was a statutory right. Accordingly, Convocation, which included two members from the committee, upheld the decision of the Discipline Committee and then considered motions as to whether
the solicitor should be suspended or disbarred.
At this point, French applied to the Supreme Court of Ontario4 to quash
the decisions of both the Discipline Committee and the Convocation on
grounds that the Convocation proceedings were essentially an appeal from
the decision of the committee, and therefore:
1) the members of the committee were disqualified by bias or a reasonable apprehension thereof from sitting on Convocation;
*@Copyright, 1976, Richard 0. Gasparini.

Mr. Gasparini is a member of the 1977 graduating class of the University of
Ottawa Law School.
1 (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
2 R.S.O. 1970, c. 238, s. 13(7)(b).

3 At common law, failure to give notice has been held not to be a question of law
and thus might not nullify proceedings: C.P.R. v. Kindzierski, et al. (1954), 2 D.L.R.
715. However, where the statute explicitly provides for notice, it must be strictly observed: Forrest v. Caisse Populaire (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 440.
4 (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 692; [1972] 2 O.R. 766.

482

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

14, No. 2

2) participation of committee members on Convocation amounted to a denial
of natural justice.

Osler, J., of the Supreme Court of Ontario, found no breach of natural
justice in the committee proceedings, but quashed the decision of Convocation;
he ordered the Convocation to reconsider the findings of the Discipline Committee without the participation of any committee members. It was the court's
view that a true construction of The Law Society Act "does in fact give a right
of appeal and that this was the nature of the proceedings" 5 in Convocation;
thus it would be against the rules of natural justice for committee members
to sit on Convocation.
The subsequent appeals of both French and the Law Society to the
Ontario Court of Appeal0 were dismissed without written reasons. Leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was then granted.
In the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, Spence, J.,
does not perceive the Convocation as an appeal; he therefore holds that there
was "no bar to the benchers who were members of the Discipline Committee
sitting on Convocation."'7 The majority opinion is based on the reasoning of
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Re Merchant and Benchers of the Law
Society of Saskatchewan8 in which the court held that the Convocation of
the Law Society of Saskatchewan is the second stage of a two-step procedure
involving, initially, an investigation and report undertaken by the Discipline
Committee, followed by judicial disposition in Convocation. In addition to
adopting this view, Spence, J., notes that even if the Convocation were an
appeal, The Law Society Act of Ontario abrogates the rules of natural justice
by impliedly permitting the duplication of committee members on Convocation.
In his dissent, concurred in by Ritchie and Dickson, JJ., Chief Justice
Laskin minimizes the importance of whether or not the Convocation was
hearing an appeal; rather, he focusses on what he considered to be the "key
issue"0 before the court, namely, whether or not the proceedings of the
Discipline Committee were 'adjudicative' and if they were, whether or not a
reasonable apprehension of bias was created by the presence of committee
members in Convocation. The learned Chief Justice observes that the Saskatchewan court failed to note that, in the Re Merchant case, committee
members were "involved (in) an adjudication of guilt"' 0 ; the fact that the

same members sat on appeal in Convocation clearly gave rise to a real likelihood of bias. Laskin, C.J.C., comments:
I do not think that I stretch the conception of bias beyond reasonable limits in
supporting the disqualification of members of an adjudicative body when they
5 [1972] 2 O.R. 766 at 778.
0 (1974), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 22n; 1 O.R. (2d) 513n.
7 Supra, note 1 at 17.
8 (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 178.
0
Supra, note 1 at 4.
10Id. at 8.
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come to its proceedings with their names attached to previous findings of guilt
upon which those proceedings are based.'1

The dispute between the majority and dissenting opinions seems to focus
upon the issues of whether the Discipline Committee proceedings may be
classified as 'judicial' or 'investigatory' and, if judicial, whether the governing
statute has superceded the rules of natural justice which would otherwise
apply. An attempt to understand the issues and, perhaps, arrive at a conclusion as to whether the majority or the dissenting view is to be preferred,

must begin with an examination of how the functions of an administrative
body are classified.
A.

JUDICIAL OR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION

There is general agreement among both legal scholars and members of
the judiciary' 2 that the task of classifying an administrative function is extremely difficult. A few authors have gone so far as to suggest that administrative acts are not a priori amenable to classification.' 3 Yet the courts must
make such determinations in order to decide whether or not, in the absence
of overriding statutory provisions, certain common law procedural requirements have been satisfied. Their task has been made easier by the formulation
of certain "tests", according to which an administrative' 4 function may be
classified. These tests are derived from numerous decisions in the area of
administrative law; while no single test will result in a definitive solution to
a given classificatory problem, the tests, when applied as a whole, provide a
fairly reliable indicator as to whether a function is judicial,' 5 and thus subject
to certain procedural requirements of the rules of natural justice.
An examination of the French case, in the light of these tests, points to
the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is the preferable position.
A common test used to distinguish judicial functions from purely investigatory (non-judicial) functions involves examining whether or not the
exercise of that function results in a "conclusive effect". 16 Where a decision

11 Id.
32 E.g., see, L. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1965) at 181. Also, the words of Pennel, J., in Voyager Explorations,Ltd.
v. Ont. Securities Commission, [1970] 1 O.R. 237 at 242, "The test to distinguish between
an administrative act and a quasi-judicial act is almost as elusive as the Scarlet
Pimpernel."
'1 L. L. Jaffe, Id. at 181.
14
The term 'administrative' bears two meanings which differ widely. On the one
hand, it means 'agencies of administration' in the sense that the Law Society 'administers'
the statutory regulations in the Law Society Act, see, Gruen Watch Co. v. A.G. (Can.)
(1950), O.R. 429 et passim. On the other hand, it means a function which is 'non-judicial'
and therefore not subject to the rules of natural justice, see, Composers, Authors, et al.
v. Maple Leaf Broadcasting, [1953] Ex. C.R. 130. It should now be clear that, in its
context, the word, here, is being used in the former sense.
15S. A. DeSmith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens &
Sons, Ltd., 3d ed., 1973) at 68-77, et passim.
16 Id. at 69.
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rendered by an administrative body is conclusive in its effect, it is immune
from collateral' 7 or indirect challenge and is legally binding until it is set
aside on appeal. 18 Moreover, a conclusive decision is a strong indication that
the body making the decision is not investigatory.' 9 The appropriate question,
therefore, is whether or not the decision of the Discipline Committee was
conclusive.
The wording of the relevant portions of the governing statute indicates
that it was. For example, references are found to the "decision" made by the
committee 0 which may include "conclusions of law '21 and "findings of
guilt 2 2 from which a person is given a "right of appeal". 23 In other words,
a "decision" made by the Discipline Committee has a "legal effect" in and
of itself.2 4 Confirmation by another body is not necessary for the decision of
the committee to affect the rights of the party in question. 25 This kind of
'conclusive' authority is normally vested only in judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies. 26 However, DeSmith warns that 'conclusiveness' alone "is not a decisive factor" 27 and that certain other tests must be satisfied before it can be
stated with assurance that the function of a statutory body is judicial.
The other tests are concerned with 'form' and 'procedure'; they focus
upon the presence, or noticeable absence, of certain formal attributes accorded
to the proceedings of a statutory body. For example, it is important that the
body may call witnesses to testify before it under oath;28 that a "decision" has
been made; that "notice" has been given; 20 and that the body is entitled to
17D. M. Gordon, "Administrative Tribunals" (1964), 12 Chitty's Law Journal,
92 at 93, suggests that the only time a 'judiciar function may be attacked collaterally
is "when it is void, that is, when it has been made without jurisdiction."
1sTo the extent that a 'conclusive decision' is legally binding until overturned on
appeal, the rights of the party in question will be affected. See, Fairburn v. Highway
Traffic Bd. of Sask. (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 709; L'Alliance des Professeurs v. Labour
Relations Bd.(Quebec), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140, (see, also, note 25).
1 Supra, note 15 at 93.
20 R.S.O. 1970, c. 238, s. 33(12).
21 Id.
22 Id., s. 38.
23 Id., s. 33(12).
24
Notice, for example, the authority of the Discipline Committee to 'reprimand'
a member whose conduct has been found to be unprofessional: R.S.O. 1970, c. 238, s.37.
25 The majority of the S.C.C. in French advanced a weak argument which suggested

that only the Convocation may take the requisite disciplinary action under s. 34. Surely
this view is an obfuscation of the distinction between a finding of guilt and a decision
as to the appropriate punishment flowing from that finding! Moreover, it has been
explicitly held that where a statutory body has the power to affect rights, that body is
exercising a judicial (or quasi-judicial) function; see, Korytko v. Calgary (1964), 42
D.L.R. (2d) 717; L'Alliance des Professeurs v. Labour Relations Board (Quebec),

[1953] S.C.R. 140.
2
6 Supra, note 15 at 69.
27 Id.
28
See, Jackson v. Price Tribunal (No. 2), [1950] N.Z.L.R. 448 at 449.
20
See, Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18.
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impose "sanctions" upon the offending party.3 0 An examination of The Law
Society Act of Ontario will reveal that the authority vested in the Discipline
Committee embraces each of the above attributes: ss. 33(10) and 33(11)
deal with the summoning of witnesses who are compelled to testify under oath;

ss. 33(12) and 33(13) explicitly refer to "decisions" made by the Discipline
Committee after which "notice" must be given. Finally, s. 37 gives authority
to the committee to impose a "sanction", a formal reprimand.
It might be argued, nevertheless, that a judicial function is not convincingly established until there can be shown a lis inter partes.31 This objection has little merit;3 2 the courts have held that, in many instances, a statutory
body is under an "implied duty" to act judicially in accordance with the rules
of natural justice, even though that body is not expressly required to determine
a lis between parties3 3 For example, in administrative law, licensing bodies
have been found to possess aspects of form and procedure sufficiently judicial
in scope that they have been said to settle disputes.3 4 In light of this, it can be
said with some certainty that the statutory procedures according to which
the committee was empowered to function - conducting the hearing, summoning witnesses, finding guilt, giving notice, etc., - were more than sufficient
to imbue it with the aura of a judicial body.
B.

DO THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE APPLY?
Except where a statute indicates otherwise, the proceedings of a statutory

body characterized as judicial (or quasi-judicial) in nature must adhere to
the principles of natural justice.3 5 This term is used in varying contexts to
30

See, British Columbia Packers v. Smith (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 711 at 716
(obiter), where an example was given of a disciplinary committee of a law society characterized as a body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Note, that where a
statutory body has the power to administer disciplinary functions, the presumption is
strong that the body is acting judicially or quasi-judicially. Compare with: The Law
Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 238, s. 37.
31
Literally, a dispute between parties.
32 J. F. Northey, "Administrative Law: Executive or Judicial Function The
Problem of Characterization" (1954), 32 C.B.R. 87 at 92 suggests that "[ihe mere
existence of a 'lis' or a duty to hear two sides will not alone serve as a test of whether
a tribunal is exercising a quasi-judicial function. However, the existence of a 'lis', taken
together with other circumstances, may incline the court to characterize the function
as quasi-judicial." See, also, R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Comm., ex p. Brand, [1952]
2 Q.B. 413 at 425 where counsel argued that a duty to act judicially does not arise unless
there is some form of 'lis' and there is a duty to hear both sides. Parker, J., at 428,
refused to accept that test and pointed out that where "the decision is that of an administrative body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty
to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at that decision notwithstanding
the absence of a 'lis inter partes'."
33
Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40.
3
4 Discussed with case annotations, supra, note 15 at 71-72.
35
This topic is discussed lucidly and thoroughly in: McRuer, Royal Commission
Inquiry Into Civil Rights, 1968, Report #1, Vol. 1, Ch. HI, at 136-47.
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denote different concepts. 36 Most often, natural justice refers to two basic

legal principles: audi alteram partem,37 and nemo judex in causa sua.5 8 It has
4

been held in both Britain3 9 and Canada 0 that, at common law, actual bias '
or even the real likelihood of bias2 on the part of any member of a judicial
body is so grave a breach of natural justice 43 that it is sufficient ground for
the disqualification of the entire tribunal. 44
There are numerous circumstances which may give rise to bias4" or, at

46 The term 'natural justice', apparently, "cannot be comprehensively or precisely
defined" and, indeed, "other language and terms have been used to express the same
concept;" the McRuer Report, #1, Vol. 1, Ch. H, at 136. See, also, James McL.
Hendry, "Some Problems on Canadian Administrative Law" (1967), 2 Otawa Law
Review, 71 at 79, who writes that, quite simply, "the concept 'natural justice' lacks
precision .... "
37
Literally, no one shall be condemned unheard.
38 No one can be the judge in his own cause. This rule is often referred to as the
rule against bias on the part of the decision maker. It is discussed briefly in R. I. Cheffins,
The ConstitutionalProcess in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada, 1969),
at 127-28 and more extensively in H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 3d ed., 1974) at 186, et passim.
89 Local Government Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120; Leeson v. General Council
of Medical Education (1889), 43 Ch. Div. 366.
40 International Union of Mine Workers v. United Steel Workers of America
(1964), 48 W.W.R. 15 (B.C.C.A.), where the allegedly biased member merely sat at
the hearing without actually participating in the final disposition of the case.
41 David J. Mullan, Administrative Law, title #3 from Vol. 1 of the Canadian
Encyclopaedic Digest (Ontario), 3d ed. (Montreal: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1973) at 3-72,
suggests that the "courts will seldom, if ever, look for proof of actual bias in a decisionmaker before they are prepared to grant a remedy." See, for example, Ex parte Perry
(1929), 2 D.L.R. 289.
42 J. McL. Hendry, supra, note 36 at 81, writes: "Bias may take two forms. The
first is pecuniary interest and the second is where there is a real likelihood, arising from
circumstances such as would give rise to a challenge to the favour that a judge or justice
would have bias." On the existence of a 'real likelihood of bias', see, R. v. Rand, [1866]
L.R. 1; Q.B. 230, which is reputed to be the foundation case of all modem law on the
subject of bias. At 232-33, Blackburn, J. was of the view that "[w]herever there is a
'real likelihood' (emphasis added) that the judge would, from kindred or any other
cause, have bias in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong for him to
act ...... ; also, see, Magee v. Cookson, et al. (1968), 65 W.W.R. 321 where it was
held that "it is not necessary that actual bias be shown; it is enough that an applicant
can show a real likelihood of prejudice."
43 The essence of the violation is summed-up in the classic phrase, "Justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." R. v.
Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256.
44
See, R. v. Ontario Lab. Rel. Rd.; ex p. Hall, [1963] 2 O.R. 239 at 243-44; Re:
Labour Rel. Bd., Int'l Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Loc. 1011 v. United
Steel Workers of America, Loc. 2592 and Lab. Rel. Bd. (1964), 48 W.W.R. (N.S.) 15
at 17. See, also, R. v. Allan, 4 B & S 915 at 926, where in an obiter comment, it was
suggested that judges who are even "suspected of improper motives" might be disqualified. An interesting comment has been made by Robert M. Sedgewick, Jr., in
"Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Administrative Tribunals" (1945),
23 C.B.R. 456, where it is suggested that "Where a person acts as both prosecutor and
judge in the same case, it is clear that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. To
say that such a person would not be interested in securing a conviction would be to
hold too high an opinion of the integrity of mankind."
45 These are discussed and illustrated by Mullan, supra,note 41 at 3-73.
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least the 'real likelihood' of it; among the more obvious is the participation
of the decision-maker on an appeal from his own decision.46 Nevertheless,
in some cases, this kind of duplication is permitted by virtue of statutory
47
authorization which supercedes the common law principles of natural justice.
authorization, the courts are
However, if the statute is not clear about such
48
generally reluctant to imply it into the statute.
For example, in R. v. Alberta Securities Commission,49 it was held that,
since the statute did not authorize it, the presence on the review tribunal of
the chairman whose order was under review constituted bias. In R. v. Law
Society of Alberta,5° duplication was reluctantly allowed, but only because
s. 67(2) of The Legal Profession Act l - the governing statute of the Law
Society of Alberta - specifically authorized such duplication.
Unfortunately, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
French case does not follow those judgments; instead it upholds the decision
in Re Merchant, which holds that, "unless there is legislation to the contrary,"
there is no prohibition upon a committee member sitting on appeal from his
own decision. In the French case, the majority pursues this line of reasoning
by noting that while s. 39 of The Law Society Act of Ontario forbids duplication of committee members on Convocation to hear an appeal against an
order of reprimand, s. 33(12), under which the proceedings against French
were conducted, is silent on the same matter. Because of this silence, Spence,
J., concludes that even if the Convocation were an appeal (and not merely
the second stage of a single proceeding), then, by implication, "members of
the Discipline
Committee could sit in Convocation on the hearing of that
8' '2
appeal.
By now, it should be clear that the majority view is inappropriate on
two grounds. First, the holding asserts that the Convocation hearings were
not in the nature of an appeal, but rather the adjudicative phase of a single
proceeding, commenced by an investigation conducted in committee. This
view would appear to be improper since the committee proceedings, when
analysed in the light of certain traditional tests used to determine the nature
of an administrative function, must be reasonably characterized as judicial.
This, of course, means that the hearings in Convocation were, in fact, an
appeal. As such, the Convocation should have abided by the rules of natural
justice.
Chief Justice Laskin, in his dissenting opinion, did not doubt that the
46
Law v. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, [1919] 2 Ch. Div. 276, where it
was held that a council had acted "as both accusers and judges" by sitting on both the
Discipline Committee and the governing council. The decision of the council was declared invalid and ultra vires. See, also, R. v. Carroll and Johnson, ex p. Sutherland,
[1970] 1 O.R. 66.
47 King v. University of Saskatchewan (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (S.C.C.).
48 Wingrove v. Martin (1934), Ch. Div. 423.
49 (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 140.
50 (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 199.
51 R.S.A. 1966, c. 46, s. 67(2).
52 Supra, note 1 at 15.
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committee was exercising a judicial function and that with respect to the
Convocation, the rules of natural justice must "be evidenced not by post facto
review of proceedings to determine whether there was bias in fact but rather
by a scrupulous
regard for any reasonable apprehension of bias or of
interest. '' 53
Secondly, the majority opinion insisted that even if the committee was
exercising a judicial function, and even if the rules of natural justice would
"normally" apply, the governing statute of the Law Society, by implication,
superceded those rules. This view seems improper since it goes against the
holdings of other courts in both Britain and Canada. As noted above, courts
are generally reluctant to exclude the rules of natural justice from judicial
or quasi-judicial functions unless the empowering statute expressly provides
for such exclusion. Laskin, C.J.C., observed that regard for this tendency of
the courts is even more important "when it is the organized legal profession
whose conduct is under scrutiny. It is a reasonable expectation that lawyers,
in their organized capacity as the governing body of their profession, should
be most sensitive
to the application of the rationale underlying the principle
'5 4
of impartiality.
In short, the majority decision in the French case has done very little
to clear-up the singularly 'cloudy' branch of administrative law concerning
the classification of administrative functions; nor has it impressed anyone by
its apparent blindness to the ancient axiom that justice should not only be
done, it should also appear to have been done. The appearance given here
is anything but that of justice being done. 55
53

54
55

Supra, note 1 at 4.
Supra, note 1 at 6.
Mr. French was ultimately disbarred by the Law Society of Upper Canada.

